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I
t could be said that the hedge fund industry, compared to its brethren in the
asset management arena, was in its infancy up until a decade ago. Information
about these funds, both qualitative and quantitative, was not freely available to the
general investment public until academic research on hedge funds started in the
1990s, with Fung and Hsieh (1997), Eichengreen et al. (1998), Schneeweis and Spurgin
(1998), Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), and Brown, Goetzmann, and
Ibbotson (1999).
At the turn of the century, coinciding with the bursting of the Internet bubble,
institutional investors began increasing their allocation to hedge funds, responding in
part to the lackluster performance of global equity markets. As a result, assets under
management (AUM) by the hedge fund industry grew exponentially, and the number
of hedge funds doubled over the past five years, by some estimates.
1 Consequently,
institutional investors figure more prominently in the industry’s clientele. This clien-
tele shift in turn precipitated profound changes in the way hedge funds operate—
such as increased transparency, better compliance, and higher operational standard,
to name just a few. Some have referred to this change as the “institutionalization” of
the hedge fund industry.
Accompanying these changes came the rising demand for rigorous research into
hedge fund performance. At the same time publicly available hedge fund databases
became ubiquitous. Together they have spawned a fast-growing body of published
studies on hedge funds—professional as well as academic. Although there is no official
count of academic papers on hedge funds, a reasonable conjecture is that their num-
bers have grown at an even faster pace than the hedge fund industry. 
This paper provides an overview, albeit somewhat biased, on a particular school
of thought in this growing body of hedge fund research. The school of thought to
which we refer is the thesis put forward in Fung and Hsieh (1999) on the economic
rationale of the hedge fund business model:
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Consider the problem confronting a money manager who believes that he has a
set of skills that could earn above average risk adjusted returns. We are not
advocating the existence of such strategies, but merely the hypothesis that the
manager believes this to be so. Let us assume that the manager has a limited
amount of personal wealth. In order to meet the fixed costs of a trading opera-
tion, the manager must leverage his skills and beliefs by attracting external
capital. Basically, he is financing a new venture. The choice is either equity
financing, in the form of a fund, or debt financing, in the form of putting up per-
sonal assets as collateral against borrowed capital. In most cases, the manager’s
personal wealth is insufficient to secure sizeable debt financing. That leaves the
formation of a fund as the only practical financing option. (1999, 317; italics
added for emphasis)
This simple characterization of the hedge fund business model points to a funda-
mental question frequently found in hedge fund research over the past few years. In
order for an opaque “new venture” to prevail in charging investors hefty incentive
fees, it must offer returns that are not easily available from more conventional, lower-
cost alternatives such as mutual funds. Putting aside the implausible hypothesis that
superior hedge fund returns reflect the “free lunch” that has escaped other investment
professionals, we face some basic questions: How is superior performance generated?
What are the risks? Can the superior performance last? Satisfactory answers to these
questions must begin with a clear understanding of the systematic risk factors inher-
ent in hedge funds strategies.
These, in our view, are the foundational questions to be addressed in hedge fund
research. From an investor’s perspective, the answers are the key determinant of
whether hedge funds provide diversification to a portfolio of conventional assets
and—more important—whether hedge funds offer returns commensurate with the
fees they charge on a risk-adjusted basis. From the perspective of a counterparty to
hedge funds—such as prime brokers, commercial banks, and investment banks—
these answers are the key input for assessing the capital at risk for engaging in ser-
vicing and financing hedge fund businesses. From the regulator’s perspective, these
questions are key in the monitoring of the convergence risk of highly leveraged opin-
ions that can destabilize markets, creating systemic risk.
Ultimately, hedge fund managers are guided by the desire to maximize the enter-
prise value of their firms. Like most other investment opportunities, different hedge
fund strategies must yield to constraints such as diminishing return to scale (capacity
issues) as well as other unrelenting forces of economic cycles (such as strategies
falling in and out of favor, often at the mercy of market forces). Rational choices within
the hedge fund business model—such as the degree of leverage, the allocation of risk
capital to factor-related bets versus delivering alpha (excess return above exposure to
risk factors) to investors—must in turn depend on the compensation contract between
the hedge fund manager and investors (“the fee structure”). Logically, optimal con-
tracting between investors and hedge fund managers (and, for that matter, between
prime brokers and hedge fund managers) must take into account the presence of sys-
tematic risk factors inherent in hedge fund strategies.
In times of market stress, investors tend to take flight to liquidity. The transmis-
sion mechanism leading to a systemic withdrawal of risk capital from markets is not
necessarily driven by market prices. An equally plausible proposition is that when
faced with inadequate transparency, investors are innately unwilling to absorb per-
formance shocks. Put differently, when opaque investment vehicles perform poorly,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA it is hard for investors to differentiate between random shocks and systemic adverse
causes. Therefore, it is in everyone’s interest—hedge fund investors, financial inter-
mediaries who provide leverage to hedge funds, and the hedge fund managers them-
selves—to identify the appropriate level of disclosure so as to avoid the risk of a
boom-bust capital formation process in the hedge fund industry. It may be impracti-
cal for hedge fund managers to publicize details of their trading positions. However,
it is important to identify the risk factors that underlie different hedge fund strate-
gies in a way that helps investors assess
the impact of changing market conditions
on hedge fund styles.
Finally, better compensation contract
design reduces the risk of performance
shock, helps smooth the capital formation
process of the hedge fund industry, and
ultimately enhances the enterprise value
of the hedge fund firm. Properly structured, compensation contract design can pro-
vide another important deterrent to hedge fund managers engaging in excessive
leverage that may otherwise be encouraged by a loosely specified incentive contract.
Together with the institutionalization of the hedge fund industry, the desire to
enhance the enterprise value of the hedge fund firm may dissuade—one can hope—
hedge fund managers from applying excessive leverage. This development in turn
will better align the interests of hedge fund managers, investors, prime brokers, and
regulators. We postulate that a necessary condition for better contract design is the
recognition and proper measurement of systematic risk factors inherent in hedge
fund strategies. It stands to reason that investors seeking alpha are likely to price the
services of hedge fund managers differently from those seeking leveraged factor bets.
To begin our discussion, we provide some recent statistics on the hedge fund
industry, particularly with respect to the growth in the size of the industry and the
emergence of a dominant institutional clientele among hedge fund investors. Here we
report empirical evidence showing that investors seeking alphas allocate capital dif-
ferently from investors seeking factor bets.
An important prerequisite to estimating systematic risk factors in hedge fund
strategies is to have an accurate performance history of the hedge fund industry. We
discuss the problems with biases in hedge fund databases that must be recognized to
obtain accurate measures of returns.
Our paper then summarizes the research by addressing the fundamental question
of systematic risk exposure. We follow the framework in Fung and Hsieh (1997),
modeling hedge fund returns as a function of three key elements—how they trade,
where they trade, and how the positions are financed. The answers to the questions
of how and where hedge funds do their business are based on extensions of the
approach used to model conventional investment vehicles such as mutual funds (see,
for example, Sharpe 1992). Here, we examine the systematic risk factors in a number
of different hedge fund strategies.
The question of how hedge fund positions are financed brings up several uncon-
ventional and important issues peculiar to the hedge fund business model. First and
foremost, the ability to leverage, coupled with the existence of common risk factors
among different hedge fund strategies, raises the question of market impact. Put
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1. Hedge Fund Research (HFR) estimated the number of hedge funds to be 3,617 in 1999 versus the
latest estimate of 8,219 as of the end of June 2005.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 
Are hedge fund managers evil geniuses who
profit from wreaking havoc in capital mar-
kets, or do they represent “smart money,”
providing risk capital to capital markets
unencumbered by securities regulations?4 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
differently, what if most hedge fund managers agree, albeit for different reasons, on
the “best trade”? Given that hedge fund bets are generally leveraged, what are the
risks of another Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) incident?
What does academic research have to say on the following question: Are hedge
fund managers evil geniuses who profit from wreaking havoc in capital markets, or do
they represent the quintessence of “smart money,” providing risk capital to capital
markets unencumbered by securities regulations? The paper provides a brief sum-
mary of the empirical findings on this question.
In light of the clientele shift among investors in the hedge fund industry, we report
recent findings on the return experience of alpha-oriented investors. Here we refer to
the recent paper by Fung et al. (2006). The empirical evidence points to a declining
trend of alpha to investors. This trend is consistent with the implication of the Berk
and Green (2004) model. Demand growth for alpha, coupled with the layers of fees
charged by hedge fund managers and funds-of-hedge-fund managers, has led to a dis-
proportionate share of returns in favor of product providers at the cost of investors.
New research on synthetic hedge funds (replication of hedge-fund-like returns via
mathematical models) at a lower cost to investors has been put forward. However, we
are not persuaded that the creation of synthetic hedge funds is a realistic solution to
the supply-demand imbalance between alpha producers and alpha buyers. The price
for alpha (implicit in the fee structure) has to be set so that it will encourage an
increase in alpha production. Ultimately, better alignment of interest between hedge
fund managers and investors through more appropriate compensation contracts must
be addressed. A necessary condition for better contract design is the identification of
non-alpha-related factor bets inherent in hedge fund returns. In the paper’s conclu-
sion, we share some thoughts on the capital formation process of the hedge fund
industry, alpha capacity, and a research agenda much in need of input.
Recent Growth in the Hedge Fund Industry
We start with an overview of recent developments in the hedge fund industry—size,
number of funds, style composition, and fees.
Increasing institutional demand for hedge funds. Demand for hedge funds
by U.S. institutional investors has been steadily growing in the past five years.
According to the National Association of College and University Business Officers
(NACUBO) Annual Endowment Survey, the dollar amount and percentage of assets
invested in hedge funds have been steadily rising. As shown in panel A of Table 1, on an
equally weighted basis, endowments have increased allocation from 3.1 percent in
1999 to 8.7 percent in 2005. On a dollar-weighted basis, the increase is even more
dramatic, from 5.1 percent in 1999 to 16.6 percent in 2005. This growth has taken
place across the board, for small as well as large endowments. The dollar amounts in
panel B show an increase of $11.3 billion in 2000 to $49.6 billion in 2005.
Following the lead of university endowments, U.S. pension plans are also increas-
ing their investments in hedge funds. According to Pensions and Investments, the
largest 200 U.S. defined-benefit pension plans invested $3.2 billion, or 0.1 percent of
their assets, in hedge funds in 2000. This investment grew to $29.9 billion, or 0.8 per-
cent of their assets, in 2005.
Growth in number of funds and assets under management. The supply of
hedge funds has grown with the increase in demand for hedge funds, but the actual
size of the hedge fund industry is harder to measure. Unlike the mutual fund indus-
try, hedge funds do not have an industry association to collect and report their infor-
mation. Instead, hedge funds voluntarily provide information to one or more database
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA vendors. The lack of a uniform reporting standard makes it difficult to assess the true
size of the hedge fund industry.
There are now three commercial databases of hedge funds each having more than
ten years of actual data collection experience: the Center for International Securities
and Derivatives Markets (CISDM) at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst,
Hedge Fund Research (HFR) in Chicago, and Lipper TASS (TASS).
2 In this section,
we exclude funds of funds (FoFs) from consideration to avoid double counting, since
FoFs invest in other hedge funds. As of December 2004, TASS had 4,130 funds (2,431
live and 1,699 defunct), HFR had 5,158 funds (2,939 live and 2,219 defunct), and
CISDM had 3,246 funds (1,315 live and 1,931 defunct).
While many hedge funds report to only a single database, some hedge funds
report to more than one database. An ongoing project at the BNP Paribas Hedge
Fund Centre of the London Business School is merging several databases to achieve
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2. There are three notable entrants to this field—Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI),
Eureka Hedge, and Standard and Poors (S&P). Because of their late entry to this field, their data
were largely from reconstructed history rather than real-time collection of hedge fund perfor-
mance. In this paper, we use the TASS database as of February 2005, HFR as of January 2005, and
CISDM as of December 2004. We report the results up through December 2004.
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Table 1
U.S. Institutional Assets Allocated to Hedge Funds
All university All university Top 200
endowment endowment DB pension
(equally weighted) (dollar-weighted)  (dollar-weighted)









2001 4.2 6.1 0.11
2002 5.1 11.3 0.33
2003 6.1 13.5 0.50
2004 7.3 14.7 0.66
2005 8.7 16.6 0.84







Source: NACUBO, Annual Endowment Survey, various issues; Pensions and Investments, various issues6 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
a comprehensive picture. A great deal of effort has been expended to obtain an accu-
rate assessment of the statistical characteristics of the hedge fund industry, elimi-
nating the risk of double counting due to the lack of a uniform reporting standard in
the industry.
3 At the completion of this project, we will have one of the most com-
prehensive academic hedge fund databases to work with. An early output of this proj-
ect is Figure 1, which reports the differences among five databases in the form of a
Venn diagram.
At the present stage, we quantify the growth of the industry using the three
databases, shown in Table 2. In TASS, the number of hedge funds grew from 1,778 at
the end of 1999 to 2,431 at the end of 2004. The growth rate of 37 percent resulted from
2,111 new funds and 1,258 exiting funds. In HFR, there were 2,062 funds at the end of
1999, growing by 43 percent to 2,939 at the end of 2004, with 2,552 entries and 1,478
exits. In contrast, the number of funds in CISDM actually fell from 1,470 to 1,315
between 1999 and 2004, with 1,372 entries and 1,412 exits.
A comparable picture emerges from the estimates of industry totals made by var-
ious consultants. For example, the HFR Industry Report for the third quarter of 2005
estimated that the number of funds grew from 3,102 in 1999 to 5,782 in 2004 and that
AUM grew from $456 billion in 1999 to $973 billion in 2004.
From our earlier thesis of the hedge fund business model, a hedge fund is more
akin to a start-up than to a mutual fund. The high attrition rates (around 10 percent





































The Hedge Fund Universe in 2005: TASS, HFR, CISDM, Eureka Hedge, and MSCI
Source: CISDM, Eureka Hedge, HFR, MSCI, TASSper year) in hedge funds are comparable to those of young firms. Hedge fund returns
also contain substantial idiosyncratic risk, typical of small undiversified firms.
Figure 2 illustrates the low correlation of hedge fund returns (versus the high cor-
relation of mutual fund returns) to standard asset classes, updating the results
reported in Fung and Hsieh (1997). Here we use 2,082 hedge funds in TASS and
14,927 mutual funds from the Morningstar January 2005 CD. Each fund is required
to have at least thirty-six monthly returns but only the last sixty monthly returns if
the fund has a longer history. Each fund’s returns are regressed on eight asset classes
comparable to those in Fung and Hsieh (1997),
4 and the distribution of the R
2s for
each group is tabulated. As before, hedge funds have much lower correlation with
the asset classes than mutual funds.
Changes in styles and strategies. Beyond having low correlation to standard
asset classes, hedge funds form a heterogeneous group that use many different strate-
gies delivering returns, which can be quite different from each other.
5 Consultants
classify hedge funds according to qualitative self-described styles. For example, TASS
classifies hedge funds into ten styles. Convertible arbitrage funds typically attempt
to extract value by purchasing convertible securities while hedging the equity, credit,
and interest rate exposures with short positions of the equity of the issuing firm and
other appropriate fixed-income related derivatives. .   Dedicated shorts are funds that
specialize in short selling securities that are perceived to be overpriced, typically
equities. Emerging market funds specialize in trading the securities of developing
economies. Equity market neutral funds typically trade long-short portfolios of
7 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
3. We thank MSCI and Eureka Hedge for allowing us access to their databases.
4. These classes are MSCI North American equities, MSCI non-U.S. equities, IFC emerging market
equities, JPMorgan U.S. government bonds, JPMorgan non-U.S. government bonds, gold (London
a.m. fixing), the Federal Reserve trade-weighted dollar index, and the one-month eurodollar deposit
rate (previous month).
5. Fung and Hsieh (1997) found that the first five principal components explained less than 50 per-
cent of the cross-sectional variation in hedge fund returns. 
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Table 2
Number of Funds in TASS, HFR, and CISDM
TASS (as of February 2005) HFR (as of January 2005) CISDM (as of December 2004)
Year Start Entry Exit End Start Entry Exit End Start Entry Exit End
1994 650 211 29 832 823 270 23 1,070 513 224 25 712
1995 832 249 58 1,023 1,070 384 55 1,399 712 220 98 834
1996 1,023 295 119 1,199 1,399 374 171 1,602 834 293 87 1,040
1997 1,199 316 90 1,425 1,602 374 172 1,804 1,040 334 117 1,257
1998 1,425 307 145 1,587 1,804 381 320 1,865 1,257 290 192 1,355
1999 1,587 367 176 1,778 1,865 419 222 2,062 1,355 313 198 1,470
2000 1,778 365 206 1,937 2,062 407 310 2,159 1,470 256 191 1,535
2001 1,937 384 229 2,092 2,159 451 251 2,359 1,535 249 216 1,568
2002 2,092 406 233 2,265 2,359 489 252 2,596 1,568 257 233 1,592
2003 2,265 339 221 2,383 2,596 457 245 2,808 1,592 164 234 1,522
2004 2,383 250 193 2,431 2,808 329 198 2,939 1,522 133 340 1,315
Source: TASS, HFR, CISDM8 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
equities with little directional exposure to the stock market. Event driven funds
specialize in trading corporate events, such as merger transactions or corporate
restructuring. Fixed-income arbitrage funds typically trade long-short portfolios
of bonds. Macro funds bet on directional movements in stocks, bonds, foreign
exchange rates, and commodity prices. .    Long/short equity funds are typically
exposed to a long-short portfolio of equities with a long bias. Managed futures
funds are specialists in futures trading, typically employing trend-following strate-
gies. All other strategies are grouped into others. In a later section we will describe
the risk factors in many of these styles.
Based on a study performed by TASS, Table 3 shows how the style composition
has changed over the years. Regarding the number of funds, panel A shows the style
composition has been quite stable since 1999. For assets under management, panel B
shows that there has been a slight decline in macro funds (from 15 percent in 1999
to 10 percent in 2004) and long/short equity funds (from 45 percent to 32 percent)
with an increase in others (from 0.4 percent to 10 percent).
The HFR Industry Report done in September 2005 provides some additional
useful information. In terms of fund age, 13 percent of hedge funds are less than one
year old, 18 percent are between one and two years old, 15 percent are between two
and three years, 21 percent are between three and five years, and 33 percent are
more than five years old. In terms of AUM, 21 percent of hedge funds have less than
$10 million, 17 percent between $10 million and $25 million, 31 percent between $25 mil-
lion and $100 million, 12 percent between $100 million and $200 million, and 19 per-
cent have more than $200 million.
Management fees and performance fees. Current hedge fund fees are roughly
the same as they were in 1999. Table 4 shows the distribution of hedge fund fees.
Similar to mutual funds, hedge funds charge a fixed management fee as a percent of
net assets under management. Panel A in Table 4 shows that more than 70 percent
of hedge funds charge a management fee between 1 percent and 2 percent. However,































2 versus Eight Asset Classes 
Source: CISDM, HFR, TASS, Morningstar, Datastream9 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
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unlike mutual funds, hedge funds also
charge a performance fee. Panel B shows
that roughly 80 percent of them charge a
20 percent incentive fee.
Style evolution and changing
investor clientele. There has been a
growing trend for hedge funds to evolve
away from single-strategy specialists into
multistrategy entities. A case in point is
the creation of a multistrategy category
in the CSFB/Tremont index in 2003. One
might consider “multistrategy” to be a
modern variation of traditional macro
funds. While macro funds are known for
taking often highly leveraged directional
bets on conventional asset classes such as
stocks, bonds, and currencies globally in
an opportunistic manner, nowadays multi-
strategy hedge funds allocate risk capital opportunistically among different hedge
fund strategies applied to global markets. Both macro and multistrategy hedge funds
can be thought of as tactical asset allocators of risk capital.
The emerging dominance of multistrategy hedge funds is consistent with our
thesis on the hedge fund business model. Successful hedge fund firms naturally grow
and diversify so as to dampen the impact of economic cycles on their performance.
Their growth and diversification are natural consequences of the desire to maximize
the enterprise value of the hedge fund management firm. The conventional qualita-
tive approach to assessing the risk of multistrategy hedge funds is unlikely to yield
much insight. A risk-factor approach may well be the only alternative to describing
the performance characteristics of this important class of hedge funds.
On the investor side, consistent with our conjecture of an emerging clientele effect,
empirical evidence shows behavioral differences in the way capital is allocated between
investors seeking alpha versus investors seeking factor bets. Fung et al. (2006) find
that alpha investors have a steady flow of investments to hedge funds, while beta
investors exhibit return-chasing behavior similar to mutual fund investors.
Statistical Issues in Hedge Fund Data
A proper study of hedge fund returns requires accurately measured data. Hedge fund
researchers have been aware of potential biases in hedge fund databases resulting
from the nature of the data collection process. Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft
(1999) pointed out that hedge fund databases have survivorship bias, liquidation
bias, backfill bias, and selection bias.
6 Liang (2000) and Fung and Hsieh (2000b) pro-
vided additional discussions. In this section, we provide updates to these issues using
three commercial data sets—TASS, HFR, and CISDM.
7
Selection bias. Since inclusion in a database is at the discretion of a hedge fund
manager, hedge fund databases can suffer from selection bias. This bias arises when
the hedge funds in a database are not representative of the universe of hedge funds.
It is difficult to estimate the selection bias since we are not able to observe funds that
are not part of a database.
It is tempting to theorize the direction of selection bias. Since hedge funds are not
allowed to advertise, the only way to gain access to investors is to participate in a




0 percent–0.99 percent 5 3 4
1 percent–1.99 percent 73 72 78
2 percent–2.99 percent 20 22 17
3 percent and up 3 2 1
B: Incentive fees
0 percent–19.99 percent 10 10 18
20 percent 85 86 78
20.01 percent and up 5 4 4
Table 4
Distribution of Management Fees and 
Incentive Fees in Live Funds
Source: TASS, HFR, CISDMhedge fund database. One might expect
funds that have superior performance
would enter a database to attract investors.
However, there is a counterbalancing
argument. Many successful funds that are
closed to new investors choose not to be a
part of a database. Thus, neither the mag-
nitude nor the direction of the net effect
of selection bias is clear, whether the
funds in a database have higher or lower
returns than funds not in a database. In
the future, the selection bias effect could
be estimated if we could gain access to
private databases that include hedge funds not in a publicly available database.
Survivorship bias. A natural consequence of our hedge fund business model is
the simple prediction that a hedge fund ceases to be a viable business proposition if
the fund cannot achieve the economy of scale to provide the fund manager adequate
operating leverage. For operational funds, this fateful endpoint usually happens
when investors are disappointed by the fund’s performance and vote with their feet
by redeeming their capital. It is also possible that the fund-raising effort of the hedge
fund manager failed to attract the critical mass necessary to make the fund a viable
business proposition. Without reference to the outlier of undiscovered jewels, it is
generally true that surviving (or live) funds have better returns than dead funds. This
point has been long recognized in the mutual fund literature, for example, Brown et al.
(1992) and Malkiel (1995). Following that literature, we measure survivorship bias as
the average return of surviving funds in excess of the average return of all funds, both
surviving and defunct.
Table 5 provides the annualized average return of live hedge funds in the three
databases from 1994 until 2004. It is 14.4 percent for TASS (14.3 percent for HFR and
15.5 percent for CISDM). The average return of “live + defunct” funds is 12.0 percent
for TASS (12.5 percent for HFR, 13.1 percent for CISDM). Therefore, the survivor-
ship bias is 2.4 percent for TASS (1.8 percent for HFR, 2.4 percent for CISDM). These
percentages are consistent with the estimates in prior research using earlier samples,
and they are larger than the survivorship bias in mutual funds, typically found to be
between 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent.
As the industry matures, we believe the severity of survivorship bias will be
reduced, based on the following insight. Hedge funds become defunct for various
reasons. Poorly performing funds either liquidate or stop reporting their returns,
causing survivorship bias. However, successful funds that are closed to new invest-
ments often stop reporting to databases. This latter type of defunct fund would not
create a survivorship bias. As of December 2004, among defunct funds in HFR, 41 per-
cent were liquidated, 13 percent were closed to new investments or no longer report-
ing, and the remaining 46 percent were not reporting. The liquidated defunct group
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6. Fung and Hsieh (1997) used a database of surviving funds. Unable to collect information on delisted
funds, they explicitly acknowledged their shortcomings. Their analysis of the styles and risk factors
of hedge funds should not be significantly affected by this data issue. 
7. To avoid introducing noise from currency fluctuations, only funds that report in U.S. dollars are
included in this update. In general, very few hedge funds do not have a version in U.S. dollars.
Therefore, focusing only on U.S. dollar–denominated funds helps avoid errors that may arise from
duplicated funds that are quoted in different currencies.
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TASS HFR CISDM
(percent) (percent) (percent)
Live 14.4 14.3 15.5
Live + defunct 12.0 12.5 13.1
Live + defunct
(excluding first 14 months) 10.5 11.2 11.6
Survivorship bias 2.4 1.8 2.4
Incubation bias 1.5 1.4 1.5
Table 5
Average Annual Returns, 1994–2004
Source: TASS, HFR, CISDM12 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
had an average annualized return of 7.2 per-
cent during the 1994–2004 period while the
other two groups both had average returns
of 10.8 percent. As the industry matures,
the proportion of the two latter types of
defunct funds is likely to increase, mitigat-
ing the severity of survivorship bias.
Incubation bias (backfill or instant
history bias). A new hedge fund usually
undergoes an incubation period to com-
pile a track record. If the track record is
respectable, the manager typically enters
the fund into a database, which is one of
the ways to attract the attention of poten-
tial investors. When a new fund enters the
database, its incubation history prior to
the entry date is “backfilled.” Thus, it is
natural to expect the early part of a fund’s
history to be biased upward—where no
lemons are on sale, at least during the
“honeymoon period.”
Since a fund does not disclose the
length of its incubation period, we can
apply our simple hedge fund business
model to infer what would be the reason-
able length of an incubation period. Let us
assume that the opportunity cost to a hedge
fund manager running his or her own fund
is simply to stay as an employee in a com-
parable investing institution, for example,
at a proprietary trading desk of an invest-
ment bank or in another asset management
firm. Departing from the comfort of an insti-
tutional setting offers the challenge of
building a business with potential enter-
prise value. Also, it offers the hedge fund
manager the opportunity to diversify his or
her client base. Note that being employed
by a single institution is somewhat equiva-
lent to having only a single investor in one’s
fund. Against these benefits are the oppor-
tunity costs—a steady stream of income
and the supply of working capital for the
business infrastructure.
These are the considerations that a
hedge fund manager must weigh during the incubation period. The opportunity costs
involved during a fund’s incubation period are likely to be substantial since most
managers of a new, fledgling hedge fund are likely to have worked in the lucrative
financial industry. Faced with these costs, most managers, logically, would expect the
incubation period not to exceed a couple of years on average.
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Fund age TASS HFR CISDM ALL
in months (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
1 3 38 96 9 8 5
2 1 03 77 1 3 6
3 2 24 34 4 4 0
4 4 03 97 1 4 8
5 3 45 07 6 4 9
6 2 83 14 3 3 4
7 5 04 16 1 4 8
8 3 02 56 7 3 6
9 4 84 65 0 4 8
10 29 53 85 51
11 36 47 61 46
12 54 38 55 46
13 57 36 81 54
14 40 61 85 59
15 61 39 72 54
16 59 48 74 60
17 51 51 77 56
18 47 40 79 52
19 55 56 62 57
20 49 43 77 53
21 52 51 77 58
22 49 45 86 54
23 32 27 66 40
24 57 30 52 44
25 38 47 78 51
26 37 49 70 48
27 63 43 60 53
28 54 46 74 55
29 39 59 75 55
30 55 36 51 47
31 52 42 59 50
32 48 45 72 54
33 57 50 68 57
34 44 61 74 57
35 41 41 66 47
36 63 30 31 38
60 45 47 64 51
120 37 40 53 43
>120 24 32 43 32
Table 6
Dropout Rate by Fund Age
Source: TASS, HFR, CISDMThis economic inference is consistent with the dropout rate of hedge funds from
databases. Table 6 provides the hazard rate, that is, the fraction of funds dropping out
of a database at a given age, averaged over TASS, HFR, and CISDM. The highest dropout
rate occurs when a fund is fourteen months old. Of course, in order to drop out of a
database, a fund must have entered it first. Thus, the fund age with the highest dropout
rate is a reasonable estimate of the length of the incubation period. Incidentally, the high
dropout rate in hedge funds is similar to
that in venture capital firms, in which typi-
cally only a low percentage (roughly 10 per-
cent) of new firms succeed.
Using the estimate of fourteen months
as the incubation period, we deleted the
first fourteen months of each fund’s return.
As shown in Table 5, the average annual
return for “live + defunct” funds now drops to 10.5 percent in TASS, leading to the
estimate of 1.5 percent to be the incubation, or backfill bias. HFR and CISDM yield
virtually the same estimate (1.4 percent for HFR, 1.5 percent for CISDM).
8 This result
is in line with previous research.
Some researchers use the information from TASS on the entry date of each
fund to estimate incubation bias. They treat all the data prior to entry as biased.
Unfortunately, this method can lead to extremely long incubation periods. This hap-
pens when a fund switches databases. For example, fund A stops reporting to HFR
and starts reporting to TASS. The part of its history after entry into HFR but before
entry into TASS is not backfill bias. A similar situation occurred after Tremont Capital
Management acquired TASS. Tremont added a significant number of funds from its
own database into TASS in September 2001. Since these funds were already tracked
by Tremont (but not by TASS), that part of their history subsequent to entry to
Tremont but prior to entry to TASS should not be treated as backfilled.
Finally, as the industry grows, the rise in demand for quantitative information on
funds in an electronic form is inevitable. More and more, hedge funds that were skep-
tical about the usefulness of hedge fund databases are slowly but surely overcoming
their aversion to reporting their performance. This trend underscores the importance
of understanding the economics of backfill bias versus the quirkiness of changes in
data collection methods.
Together, survivorship bias (roughly 2.5 percent) and incubation bias (around
1.5 percent) sum to roughly 4 percent per year. It is important to correct for these
biases, particularly when we study hedge fund excess returns (alpha) beyond expo-
sure to systematic risk factors. As we shall see later on, hedge fund alphas are esti-
mated to be around the same order of magnitude.
Liquidation bias. Hedge fund data suffer from an additional bias, called liqui-
dation bias, that does not have a counterpart in mutual fund data. Liquidation bias
refers to the fact that hedge fund managers stop reporting returns to a database
before the final liquidation value of a fund. For example, several funds lost all of their
capital during the Russian debt crisis in August 1998. However, the managers did not
report returns of –100 percent in August 1998. Instead, the returns ended in July
1998. This practice causes an upward bias in the observed returns of defunct funds.
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8. We also tried using other estimates of the incubation period: ten, fifteen, sixteen, twenty-two, and
twenty-seven months, based on different local peaks of the dropout rate in the three databases.
The resulting estimates of the incubation bias range from 1.1 percent to 1.9 percent.
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The high attrition rates in hedge funds
are comparable to those of young firms.
Hedge fund returns also contain substan-
tial idiosyncratic risk, typical of small
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It also causes value-at-risk (VaR) models, based on observed fund returns, to under-
estimate the risk of hedge funds.
To estimate liquidation bias, we must be able to follow funds until liquidation.
Doing so, unfortunately, requires substantial resources. Instead, some researchers
make arbitrary assumptions about the return of a hedge fund in the liquidating
month, for example, –100 percent, as in
Posthuma and van der Sluis (2003). Such
an approach seems extreme.
Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft
(1999) actually had estimates of liquidation
bias. They asked the data vendor (HFR in
their case) to determine the liquidation
value of hedge funds, and they report the liquidating return of funds to be 0.7 per-
cent (1999, 867–68). This return is certainly very far from the extreme assumption
of –100 percent.
In the future, it would be useful to settle this issue by asking data vendors to
determine the liquidation value of hedge funds. Another useful avenue to employ is to
directly approach the hedge fund administrators for more accurate records of the
final liquidation values of funds that ceased to operate.
Serial correlation of hedge fund returns. Krail, Asness, and Liew (2001)
observed that hedge fund indexes have serial correlation and that their returns are
correlated to past returns of market factors such as the S&P 500. This correlation can
be the result of infrequent trading of illiquid securities in their portfolios or of manip-
ulation by managers to smooth their returns. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004)
provided a formal statistical model applied to individual hedge funds. Unfortunately,
neither Krail, Asness, and Liew (2001) nor Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) were
able to distinguish between the two causes of serial correlation in hedge funds—illiq-
uid securities or return smoothing.
Over the past few years, administrative, accounting, and auditing service providers
to the hedge fund industry have been consolidating. Due diligence standards are
much higher with the ever-increasing presence of institutional investors in the hedge
fund industry. Gone are the days in which a small hedge fund partnership’s accounts
come from the manager’s accountant who happens to be his neighbor. In addition,
lenders to hedge funds such as prime brokers and investment banks also impose cer-
tain organizational standards on their hedge fund counterparties. Last but not least,
regulators are imposing compliance requirements on hedge fund companies that
operate in major capital markets. Taking all these factors together, we would argue
that, increasingly, hedge fund managers will find it difficult to manipulate the pricing
of their portfolios to smooth returns. Rather, illiquidity of the underlying market in
which a hedge fund transacts will more likely be the explanation.
The empirical evidence is certainly consistent with this line of reasoning. First,
we observe that hedge funds that trade liquid securities have returns that exhibit
little serial correlation. For example, the CSFB/Tremont Managed Futures Index
has a first-order autocorrelation of 0.07, which is not statistically different from
zero. This result is to be expected since managed futures funds tend to trade highly
liquid instruments and rely heavily on the liquidity of their position to achieve a
higher degree of leverage. In contrast, the CSFB/Tremont Convertible Arbitrage
Index has a first-order autocorrelation of 0.56, which is statistically different from
zero. Again, this outcome is hardly surprising since convertible arbitrage funds
tend to hold convertible bonds (hedging the credit risk with short positions in the
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Beyond having low correlation to standard
asset classes, hedge funds form a heteroge-
neous group that use many different strate-
gies delivering returns.equity of the issuing firms), which transact primarily in over-the-counter markets.
One could go further to assert that it is precisely the provision of liquidity by con-
vertible arbitrageurs that earns them the economic rent (see, for example, Agarwal
et al. 2006).
Second, we noted from our business model for hedge funds that prime brokers
(and investment banks) are the main suppliers of leverage to hedge funds. Given
the normal conflict between lenders and borrowers regarding position-risk sharing,
it is highly unlikely that prime brokers would share the same optimistic valuation
that would allow hedge fund managers to manipulate asset prices to smooth
returns. More often than not, the VaR models used by prime brokers (lenders) tend
to err on the conservative side when pricing portfolio positions. Since hedge fund
auditors naturally have access to prime broker reports, it is not likely that the audi-
tors would allow hedge fund managers to use their own prices that are materially
different from the prime brokers’ to determine the value of the fund. Nonetheless,
more research is needed to determine which of these competing alternatives—illi-
quidity or return smoothing—is the culprit for the observed serial correlation of
hedge fund returns.
Implication for hedge fund benchmarks. The biases in hedge fund databases
cast doubt on the extent to which hedge fund indexes derived from these databases
accurately reflect actual investment experience. The potential for performance
divergence between an index of performance statistics and its executable clone is
particularly evident in the performance of investable indexes. Circa April 2003, a
number of passive portfolio products came to market intending to mimic the return
characteristics of published indexes of hedge funds. Despite promising prelaunch pro
forma returns, these investable indexes have substantially underperformed their
respective style benchmarks. For example, the HFRX Equity Hedge Investable Index
has an annualized return of 6.6 percent from its inception in April 2003 until
September 2005, which is less than half of the 14.1 percent annualized return of the
corresponding HFRI Equity Hedge Index over the same period. 
The reasons for such a dramatic divergence in performance are many and varied.
They range from the effect of transaction costs associated with managing the mim-
icking portfolio to the unrealistic assumption of unlimited access to often scarce
capacity of some hedge funds—an inherent assumption that is present in most indexes
of hedge fund performance, albeit at varying degrees depending on the index con-
struction method. More general issues of hedge fund benchmarks are discussed in
the following section. Suffice it to say that the gulf between an index of performance
statistics (hedge fund index) and practice (actual investment experience of hedge
fund investors) can be considerable.
An alternative is to use the average return of funds of funds (FoFs), as sug-
gested in Fung and Hsieh (2000b). FoFs are actual pools of hedge funds, and, as
such, they directly reflect actual investment experience in hedge funds. The
databases on FoFs are less prone to biases (such as survivorship, incubation, etc.)
than those on individual hedge funds. Finally, the net (after FoFs fees) perfor-
mance of FoFs is the net of the costs (due diligence and portfolio construction) of
investing in hedge funds borne by the investors, which are typically not reflected
in the returns of individual hedge funds.
9 More discussions on this and related top-
ics can be found in a later section.
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9. While the investable indexes are FoFs, we are unable to determine the amount of fees charged
in these products. 
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Research on Hedge Fund Risk Factors
In this section, we address the fundamental question posted in the introduction: Are
there systematic risk factors inherent in hedge fund returns? It is important to note
that the data biases discussed in the previous section generally do not affect the
types of risk factors we find in hedge funds. Rather, data biases tend to distort esti-
mates of hedge fund alphas. 
Much research effort has been devoted to understanding the risk of hedge funds,
particularly in relating hedge fund returns to observable market risk factors. In gen-
eral, research to date can be characterized as bottom-up versus top-down. Given the
heterogeneity of hedge funds, it is natural to start from a bottom-up approach, where
a number of papers have focused on identifying the risk factors inherent in specific
styles. For example, Fung and Hsieh (2001) linked the return of managed futures
(trend followers) to option straddles. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) tracked the returns
of merger arbitrage funds to a passive merger arbitrage strategy. Duarte, Longstaff,
and Yu (2005) studied fixed-income arbitrage strategies replicating the returns of
commonly used strategies based on observable prices of fixed-income securities and
their derivatives. Agarwal et al. (2006) replicated convertible arbitrage (CA) returns
by mimicking a family of CA strategies using data from the underlying securities. The
subsections that follow provide similar analysis of the nine major hedge fund styles
described earlier.
From a top-down perspective, the question can be phrased as follows: In a diver-
sified portfolio of hedge funds, what are the irreducible risk factors? This question
has been tackled in Fung and Hsieh (2003, 2004b). Taking the two approaches
together, this section reviews the status of research starting with strategy-specific
work leading up to hedge fund portfolio factors.
Risk factors of managed futures (trend followers). The majority of managed
futures funds employ a trend-following strategy. Fung and Hsieh (2001) extended the
theoretical model in Merton (1981) from market timers to trend followers. Merton
(1981) showed that a market timer, who switches between stocks and Treasury bills,
generates a return profile similar to that of a call option on the market. Fung and Hsieh
(2001) generalized this insight on a market timer to that of a trend follower, who seeks
to profit from large up-and-down movements using both long and short positions. The
resulting return profile is similar to that of a lookback straddle.
10
Using exchange-traded standard straddles in twenty-six markets, Fung and Hsieh
(2001) replicated returns of lookback straddles. They constructed five portfolios
of lookback straddles—stock indexes, bond futures, interest rate futures, currency
futures, and commodity futures. Empirical evidence shows that three option portfo-
lios—bonds, currencies, and commodities—have strong correlation to trend follow-
ers’ returns at a level well beyond previous results. It is intuitively appealing that
market volatility has been a key determinant of trend-following returns. Since the
Fung-Hsieh (2001) study, the relationship they reported has continued to hold.
Figure 3 provides evidence on the usefulness of the lookback portfolios. The heav-
ier line represents the monthly returns of trend followers (based on the CISDM Trend
Following Index). The out-of-sample return forecasts of trend followers are gener-
ated using the regression coefficients from the regression equation in Fung and Hsieh
(2001), which was fit to data ending in 1997, and the realized values of the lookback
portfolios starting in 1998. The forecast returns continued to track the actual returns
of trend followers after the Fung and Hsieh (2001) study.
Risk factors in merger arbitrage. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) created an
index for merger arbitrage returns, using announced mergers from 1964 until 2000.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA They showed that the merger arbitrage returns are similar to those of merger arbi-
trage hedge funds. In fact, they observe that both the merger arbitrage index and
merger arbitrage funds exhibit characteristics similar to a dynamically adjusted short
position on the stock market. These results are illustrated in Figure 4.
This observation is intuitively appealing. Essentially, merger arbitrageurs are bet-
ting on the consummation of a merger—in general, they are long “deal” risk. Their
return can be viewed as the insurance premium from selling a policy against the fail-
ure to complete a merger. Typically, mergers fail for idiosyncratic reasons and can be
diversified away in a portfolio of such transactions. However, when the stock market
has a severe decline, mergers tend to be called off for a variety of reasons—ranging
from funding and pricing issues to concerns over the long-term prospects of the
economy. This scenario is one in which there is a convergence of deal risk that cannot
be easily diversified.
We note here that merger arbitrage (also known as risk arbitrage) is a substrategy
in the event-driven style discussed earlier. The other substrategy is distressed secu-
rities, which is covered in a later section.
Risk factors in fixed-income hedge funds. Fung and Hsieh (2002) analyzed
fixed-income hedge funds. They showed that convertible bond funds were strongly cor-
related to the CSFB Convertible Bond Index. High-yield funds were strongly correlated
to the CSFB High-Yield Bond Index. In addition, all styles, including fixed-income arbi-
trage (one of the major hedge fund strategies listed earlier), have correlations to
changes in the default spread.
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10. A lookback straddle consists of a lookback call option and a lookback put option. A lookback call
option allows the owner to buy the underlying asset at the lowest price during the life of the call
option. A lookback put option allows the owner to sell the underlying asset at the highest price
during the life of the put option. The lookback straddle therefore allows the owner to buy at the
low and sell at the high. The lookback option was analyzed by Goldman, Sosin, and Gatto (1979). 





































Actual and Predicted Returns of Trend Followers, 1998–2004
Source: CISDM, Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE),
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE)18 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
Figure 5 provides support for this view. Here, we graph the HFR Fixed-Income
Index against the change in credit spread, as proxied by Moody’s Baa yield over the
ten-year Treasury constant maturity yield.
In a more recent study, Duarte, Longstaff, and Yu (2005) created returns using
various fixed-income arbitrage trades frequently used by hedge funds—swap spreads,
yield-curve spreads, mortgage spreads, fixed-income volatility arbitrage, and capital
structure arbitrage.
Essentially, the swap spread trade is a bet that the fixed side of the spread (the
difference between the swap rate and the yield of the Treasury security of the same
maturity) will remain higher than the floating side of the spread (the difference
between LIBOR and the repo rate) while staying within a reasonable range that can
be estimated from historical data. Yield-curve spread trades are “butterflies,” betting
that bond prices (which can be mapped to points along the yield curve) deviate from
the overall yield curve only for short-run, tactical liquidity reasons, which dissipate
over time. Mortgage spread trades are bets on prepayment rates, consisting of a long
position on a pool of GNMA mortgages financed using a “dollar roll,” delta-hedged
with a five-year interest rate swap. Fixed-income volatility trades are bets that the
implied volatility of interest rate caps tends to be higher than the realized volatility
of the eurodollar futures contract. Capital-structure arbitrage or credit arbitrage trades
on mispricing among different securities (for example, debt and equity) issued by the
same company.
Duarte, Longstaff, and Yu (2005) found strong correlation between the returns
of these strategies and the returns of fixed-income arbitrage hedge funds. In addi-
tion, many of these strategies have significant exposure to risks in the equity and
bond markets.
Risk factors in long/short equity hedge funds. As discussed earlier, the
long/short equity style accounts for 30 to 40 percent of the total number of hedge
funds. Agarwal and Naik (2004) studied equity-oriented hedge funds, and Fung and
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Risk Factor for Merger Arbitrage Hedge Funds, 1994–2004
Source: HFR, DatastreamHsieh (2004a) focused on long/short equity funds. Basically, there is strong evidence
that long/short equity funds have positive exposure to the stock market as well as
exposure to long small-cap/short large-cap positions, similar to the SMB factor in the
Fama-French (1992) three-factor model for stocks.
Figure 6 provides support for this view. Here, we use the previous twenty-four
months of data to estimate the exposure of long/short equity funds (as proxied by the
HFRI Equity Hedge Index) to the S&P 500 and the difference between the Russell 2000
and S&P 500. The estimated coefficients are used to perform a one-month-ahead
conditional forecast.
11 The figure shows that the one-month-ahead forecast is a very
good predictor of the HFRI Equity Hedge Index return. An intuitive explanation of
these results is as follows. Typically, long/short equity hedge fund managers are stock
pickers with diverse opinions and ability. As such, individual performance of these
managers is likely to be highly idiosyncratic. However, all managers are subject to the
basic phenomenon that “underpriced stocks,” if they exist, are likely to be found among
smaller, “under-researched” stocks. On the short side, liquidity condition in the stock-
loan market makes small stocks much less attractive candidates for short sales. There
is also the question as to whether long/short hedge fund managers exhibit market
timing ability—a topic for ongoing research. Thus far, the empirical evidence does not
lend support to such a proposition (see, for example, Fung and Hsieh 2006).
Risk factors in convertible arbitrage. Using U.S. and Japanese convertible
bonds, Agarwal et al. (2006) created returns for three basic strategies frequently
employed by convertible arbitrage funds. The volatility arbitrage strategy is a bet that
the embedded option in the convertible bond is mispriced. The credit arbitrage strategy
is a bet that the credit risk in the convertible bond is mispriced. The carry strategy is
a combination of these two strategies. The results point to convertible arbitrage hedge
19 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
11. Specifically, the one-month-ahead conditional forecasts use the regression coefficients from the
previous twenty-four months and the realized values of the regressors in the subsequent month.











































































Risk Factor for Fixed-Income Hedge Funds, 1990–2004
Source: HFR, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (BOG)20 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
funds as providers of liquidity to the convertible bond market trading mainly from the
long side while hedging the inherent risk factors of the bond. One interpretation of
the Agarwal et al. (2006) results is that the return to convertible arbitrage hedge
funds stems from a liquidity premium paid by issuers of convertible bonds to the
hedge fund community.
The returns from these strategies can explain a significant part of the return vari-
ation in convertible arbitrage funds, which is illustrated in Figure 7. As in Agarwal et al.
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Risk Factor for Convertible Arbitrage Hedge Funds, 1993–2002
Source: HFR, Agarwal et al (2006)(2006), the excess return of the HFRI Convertible Arbitrage Index is regressed on
the excess returns of the Vanguard Convertible Securities Portfolio (as a proxy for
the underlying convertible bonds) and the U.S. and Japanese volatility arbitrage
strategy, credit arbitrage strategy, and carry strategy. The adjusted R
2 of the regres-
sion is 0.38. The observed returns are graphed on the vertical axis, while the fitted
values of the regression are graphed on the horizontal axis. The upward-sloping line
is evidence that the risk factors capture a significant part of the variation in the
returns of convertible arbitrage funds.
Risk factors in niche styles. This section summarizes the research findings on
risk factors inherent in the other hedge fund styles. Figure 8 shows that the hedge
fund returns of emerging market hedge funds are strongly correlated with the IFC
Emerging Market Stock Index.
Figure 9 shows that distressed securities hedge funds’ returns are strongly corre-
lated with the CSFB High-Yield Bond Index. (As noted earlier, distressed securities is
one of the two substrategies in the event-driven style, along with merger arbitrage.)
HFR has an index called Equity Non-Hedge, consisting of hedge funds that typi-
cally trade from the long side, leaving their market risk largely unhedged. Figure 10
shows that their monthly excess returns are strongly correlated with the Wilshire
Small Growth Stock Index. Figure 11 shows that dedicated short-sellers’ returns are
strongly negatively correlated with the Wilshire Small Growth Stock Index.
Thus far, we have covered the risk factors in seven of the nine styles described
earlier (excluding others). Only two styles remain—macro and equity market neutral.
Macro funds are analyzed in the next section. Equity market neutral has been a prob-
lematic style to analyze, largely because of difficulties with accurate classification of
strategies that fall into this category. Many funds in HFR and TASS carrying the equity
market neutral classification exhibit statistically significant betas to standard equity
factors; see, for example, Patton (2004). In addition, there is another category in the
HFR database, called statistical arbitrage, comprising long/short equity hedge funds
21 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
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Risk Factor for Emerging Market Hedge Funds, 1994–2004
Source: HFR, Datastream22 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
that primarily employ quantitative models to construct factor-neutral portfolios.
Statistical arbitrageurs that operate in equity markets should naturally fall within the
equity market neutral category. It is unclear to us how these distinct categorizations
are made. Taken together, one observes that there are instances in which equity mar-
ket neutral funds have significant betas to equity factors, whereas there are zero-beta
equity-related strategies that are being placed in a different category. More work is
required to arrive at an unambiguous definition of this hedge fund style.
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Risk Factor for Long-Biased Equity Hedge Funds, 1994–2004
Source: HFR, WilshireCapturing the risk in macro hedge funds. Macro fund managers are known
to be highly dynamic traders who often take highly leveraged bets on directional
movements in exchange rates, interest rates, commodities, and stock indexes.
Capturing the risk of macro funds has been a challenge to researchers given the
dynamic nature of the risk in these funds. Here, we present a simple, linear risk fac-
tor model that can capture a substantial amount of the risk to which macro funds are
exposed. It turns out that the seven-factor model of Fung and Hsieh (2004b)
(described in more detail below), which was designed for describing the inherent
risks in diversified portfolios of hedge funds, does a reasonable job in capturing the
risk of macro funds.
Figure 12 depicts the actual and one-month-ahead conditional forecast of the
HFRI Macro Index. As in the case of the forecasting exercise for long/short equity
funds in Figure 6, for each month we use the prior twenty-four months’ data to
regress the macro index on the seven risk factors. We use the regression coefficients
and the realized values of the seven risk factors in the subsequent month to gener-
ate the conditional one-month-ahead forecast. 
Perhaps these results are not too surprising because the best-known macro funds
are large funds that tactically allocate risk capital across a portfolio of “bets” across
global markets. Each bet can be thought of as a directional strategy on a portfolio of
global securities—for example, holding long government bonds of one country while
funding the position with a short position in fixed-income instruments denominated
in another currency so as to maximize the upside potential of the long position at the
lowest cost of leverage globally available. The traditional view of a macro fund’s port-
folio being guided by a very top-down view of global economic factors is, perhaps, not
too different from the tactical strategy allocation process of a portfolio of different
hedge fund strategies. Therefore, tools that work well in capturing the risk charac-
teristics of diversified hedge fund portfolios can be applied in describing the risk in
macro funds.
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Risk Factor for Short Selling Hedge Funds, 1994–2004
Source: HFR, Wilshire24 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
The challenge to academic researchers is to devise models that properly measure
the value these tactical strategy allocation decisions bring to investors.
A basic risk-factor model using asset-based style (ABS) factors. In this
section we discuss a top-down approach to modeling the risk factors of diversified
hedge fund portfolios. Understanding these risk factors is critical for investors, coun-
terparties, and regulators alike. Investors need to identify the major risk factors in
hedge fund portfolios in order to assess the impact on their overall asset allocation
profile. Similarly, counterparties to hedge funds and their regulators need to under-
stand the major sources of hedge fund risk to measure capital at risk.
Fung and Hsieh (2004b) proposed a basic risk-factor model using seven risk fac-
tors to account for the risk of diversified portfolios of hedge funds. These risk factors
are extracted from those that are found in empirical studies on many of the major
hedge fund styles. The excess return of the S&P 500 (SPMRF) and Small Cap minus
Large Cap (SCMLC) are the equity factors most important for long/short equity
funds, which comprise 30 to 40 percent of the entire industry. The return of the ten-
year Treasury bond (BD10RET) above the risk-free return and the return of Baa
bonds above the return of the ten-year Treasury bond (BAAMTSY) are the bond fac-
tors most important for fixed-income hedge funds. The three lookback portfolios in
bonds (PTFSBD), currencies (PTFSFX), and commodities (PTFSCOM) are the key
risk factors for trend followers or managed futures.
Table 7 illustrates the efficacy of the seven risk factors in explaining the returns
of several standard hedge fund indexes—the HFRI composite index, the CSFB/Tremont
composite index, and the MSCI equally weighted composite index. In addition, the
seven risk factors can explain a high percentage of the variation in the HFR Funds-
of-Funds Index.
Of general interest to investors is the estimate of a hedge fund’s alpha. For the
hedge fund indexes, alpha is between 11 and 27 basis points per month, or 1.32 per-
cent to 3.24 percent per year on a net asset value (NAV) basis. As mentioned earlier,








































Actual and Predicted Returns of HFRI Macro Funds, 1996–2004
Source: HFR, BOG, Datastream, CBOT, CME, LIFFE, NYMEX, SFEthis is on the same order of magnitude as survivorship bias (around 2.5 percent per
annum) and incubation bias (around 1.5 percent per annum). Interestingly, the aver-
age FoF does not have any positive alpha.
Note that these top-down risk factors are all based on traded securities and their
derivatives; hence we use the term asset-based to describe them. This term is appro-
priate as, by and large, hedge fund portfolios are composed of conventional securi-
ties and their derivatives. This recognition is important. Having identified readily
observable risk factors based on traded assets, we have indirectly circumvented the
opaqueness of hedge fund operations—at least for diversified portfolios. Here we
have a method for indirectly measuring the systematic risk of hedge fund investing
by observing market prices at higher frequency (than monthly NAVs of hedge funds)
and with much longer price history.
Figure 13 illustrates the usefulness of a long price history, in the form of the credit
spread (Moody’s Baa ten-year Treasury). Between the end of 1987 and September
1998 (the LTCM debacle), credit spreads had stayed in a narrow range relative to the
earlier years. This trend explains the particularly good performance and lack of large
losses of fixed-income hedge funds during that period, based on the evidence in
Figure 5 that showed fixed-income hedge funds as negatively exposed to this vari-
able. As the credit spread widened after the Russian debt default in August 1998,
fixed-income hedge funds suffered large losses. While the increase in credit spreads
was large relative to the experience of the previous ten years, the spreads were not
especially large against the backdrop of a much longer time period. Therefore, it is
not surprising that LTCM, which by many accounts was many times more leveraged
than a typical fixed-income hedge fund, nearly failed.
12
Risk monitoring and performance evaluation of hedge funds. The advan-
tage of ABS factors is not only that their portfolio-level risk factors are much more
readily observable but that they are also investable. By construction, they are derived
from traded assets in the public market. This construction provides a much more
25 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
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Table 7
Regression of Hedge Fund Composite Indexes on Seven Risk Factors,
April 2000–December 2004
HFRI CTI MSCI HFR
Risk factors composite composite composite FoF
Constant 0.0011 0.0017 0.0027 –0.0006
SPMRF 0.3126 0.1837 0.1653 0.1572
SCMLC 0.2292 0.1650 0.1654 0.1408
BD10RET 0.1661 0.2314 0.1794 0.1764
BAAMTSY 0.1656 0.1103 0.0697 0.1941
PTFSBD –0.0002 –0.0043 0.0020 –0.0021
PTFSFX 0.0108 0.0150 0.0187 0.0122
PTFSCOM 0.0218 0.0186 0.0083 0.0184
R
2 0.876 0.612 0.763 0.691
Note: Bold figures indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
Source: HFR, Tremont, MSCI, BOG, Datatream, CBOT, CME, LIFFE, NYMEX, SFE
12. LTCM claimed that it experienced a “100-year” flood. But its risk management system reportedly
used only ten years of data, stopping around December 1987. Had it used ten more years of his-
tory, it might have avoided problems in 1998.26 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
natural way of defining hedge fund alphas and hedge fund betas, which we refer to
as alternative alphas and alternative betas in Fung and Hsieh (2003).
The immediate application is clear. For investors, alpha buyers now have a way
to measure the quality of their hedge fund investment. Beta buyers (investors who
prefer leveraged factor bets) can assess whether their capital is exposed to the right
risk; and both can evaluate whether the fees they paid are appropriate. For counter-
parties, measuring the exposure to key risk factors offers a market-price-driven metric
that aggregates hedge fund risk in capital-at-risk calculations. For regulators, it pro-
vides a barometer to gauge potential convergence of systemic risk exposures from
hedge funds, proprietary desks, and conventional money managers. These issues are
explored further in the next two sections of the paper.
Hedge Funds and Regulatory Concerns
In the wake of the Asian currency crisis of 1997, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) researched into complaints by Asian government officials that hedge funds
were the primary culprit for that episode. Their findings were published in May 1998
in Eichengreen et al. (1998). The paper addressed three primary regulatory con-
cerns: investor protection, systemic risk, and market integrity. The authors noted
that “few regulators see a need for stricter regulation on the first two grounds” (1).
In terms of investor protection, regulators are generally of the view that investors
can “fend for themselves” (20). As private investment vehicles, hedge funds are avail-
able only to “accredited investors”—wealthy individuals and institutional investors.
These sophisticated investors have the savvy and the financial ability to complement
their knowledge by hiring consultants with the know-how to better understand the
risk in hedge funds. They also have sufficient wealth to withstand the risk of sizable
losses that might result from hedge fund investing.
In terms of systemic risk, regulators are concerned that banks under their super-
vision are exposed to counterparty risk in their transactions with hedge funds, but
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Source: BOG“they regard these as problems best dealt with by existing supervision of banks and
other counterparties rather than by new regulations” (21).
On the issue of market integrity, Eichengreen et al. (1998) reported that there
were concerns “that hedge funds can dominate or manipulate particular markets”
(1). But they went on to say that “many observers are skeptical that hedge funds are
large enough to dominate markets.” Thus, they arrived at the conclusion that “the
case for supervisory and regulatory initiatives directed specifically at hedge funds is
not strong” (21).
In this section, we reflect on these arguments in light of the recent events and put for-
ward a number of research questions searching for answers. Papers by Edwards (2006)
and Chan et al. (2006) at this conference cover these issues in much greater detail.
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Investor protection. Investor protection falls largely under the purview of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and to a lesser extent the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Up until 2003, the SEC has kept a fairly loose
rein on hedge funds, taking action usually only in fraud cases. In May 2003, the SEC
organized a Hedge Fund Roundtable to discuss “investor protection implications” of
hedge funds (see the SEC’s press release, 2003-40). A staff report (SEC 2003) was
published in September 2003, and the rule to require hedge fund advisers to register
as investment advisers was adopted in December 2004. SEC (2004) cited the growth
of the hedge fund industry, the increasing instances of hedge fund fraud,
14 and the
broadening of exposure to hedge funds, especially by institutional investors (for
example, public and private pension funds, universities, endowments, foundations,
and charitable organizations) who had never before invested in hedge funds, as rea-
sons for taking action to register hedge fund advisers.
While registration may not be a particularly onerous task for hedge funds, it is not
clear how it can effectively deal with the three concerns raised in SEC (2004).
In the first place, registration is not likely to slow down the proliferation of hedge
fund offerings to the small, unsophisticated investors that the SEC is concerned about.
It would be more effective to raise the requirement for “accredited investors” to make
it harder for less sophisticated investors to qualify for investing in hedge funds.
Second, hedge funds that accept money from pension plans are typically regis-
tered as investment advisers, a result of the ERISA Act of 1974.
Third, it is unclear how registration relates to the discovery and, ultimately, the
deterrence of hedge fund fraud. SEC (2004, 5) stated that fifty-one hedge fund fraud
cases were brought by the SEC for damages of $1.1 billion during 2000–04. It would
be helpful to have more research on how registration could have helped to prevent
fraud in these cases.
Systemic risk. Hedge funds can become the transmission mechanism of systemic
risk because they borrow from and trade with regulated financial institutions, such as
prime brokers and investment banks. Large losses from one or more hedge funds can
cause financial distress to the counterparties they deal with, which can in turn gener-
ate a domino effect to other financial institutions. This chain reaction is referred to as
systemic risk. The LTCM debacle put systemic risk front and center in the mind of reg-
ulators. The important point here is not to focus only on the risk of another LTCM but
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13. Edwards (2006) can be found on page 35 in this issue of the Economic Review. An abbreviated
version of the Chan et al. (2006) paper presented at the conference is on page 49 of this issue.
14. SEC (2004, 5) cited fifty-one hedge fund fraud cases brought by the SEC during 2000–04, involv-
ing $1.1 billion in damages. The rule also referred to “almost 400 hedge funds (and at least 87 hedge
fund advisers)” that were being investigated at that time.
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to be aware of the risk of a convergence of opinion among different hedge funds on
the best trade(s). Fung, Hsieh, and Tsatsaronis (2000) described this as diversifica-
tion implosion and provided empirical examples of this phenomenon.
Statistical analyses of hedge fund returns may furnish us with valuable lessons ex
post. However, these tools are generally incapable of sounding the alarm bell before
the fire engulfs the entire building. Ultimately, information about systemic risk expo-
sures estimated from up-to-date position data is needed to offer any chance of pro-
viding an early warning. A substantial amount of this data is already in the hands of
hedge fund counterparties—prime brokers and prime bankers to hedge funds. The
question is how to consolidate the infor-
mation into estimates of systemic risk expo-
sures of the industry as a whole.
Commercial service providers offering
consolidation of hedge fund position risk for
large hedge fund portfolios are available
covering a significant subset of hedge funds
that offer their products through managed
account platforms. This development is encouraging. Improved transparency by hedge
funds and the availability of better risk management tools to hedge fund investors
should help keep systemic risk in check. As things stand, investors are well placed to
rebalance hedge fund portfolios that are overly concentrated in a limited number of fac-
tor bets. To this end, investors’ interests and those of regulators are aligned. Both will
benefit from a continuing improvement in transparency from hedge fund managers.
However, a number of conflicts of interest that arise from the financing of hedge
funds by regulated financial institutions cannot be easily resolved. These can be
expressed using our simple hedge fund business model. In essence, the hedge fund
manager pledges the equity in the fund as collateral to financial intermediaries such
as prime brokers and investment banks against leveraged trading positions. As
lenders to the hedge fund, these counterparties hold the equivalent of senior debt
claims to the fund as a legal entity. Immediately, as lenders, they are exposed to the
downside risk of the hedge fund strategies they finance.
There is an obvious need to assess the systematic risk factors to which a hedge
fund strategy is exposed—in a similar manner to an investor of the fund. However,
the assessment of the upside potential is less critical (but not irrelevant) to lenders
compared to investors of a hedge fund. Good performance by a hedge fund poten-
tially leads to more business for the prime brokers. In reverse, bad-performing funds
are not good for anyone—investors and prime brokers alike. However, what about
mediocre funds that generate transactional fees to the prime brokers but offer little
value to investors? Investors would certainly like to cut these funds from their port-
folio, but would prime brokers be as quick to act since there is no apparent risk to
keeping these funds on their books? An interesting question is whether mediocre
funds searching for winning trades are more likely to herd—to become trend follow-
ers of popular trading ideas. The answer to this question will be important to
investors, financial intermediaries, and regulators.
Market integrity. A major concern of financial regulators is the potential impact
of hedge funds on financial markets. Hedge funds were mentioned in the Brady
Commission Report to be net buyers during the October 1987 stock market crash.
15 In
an IMF staff report, Eichengreen et al. (1998) conducted interviews with market par-
ticipants and hedge fund managers to gauge the role of hedge funds during various
market events, including the ERM (exchange rate mechanism) crisis in 1992, the
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Hedge funds can become the transmission
mechanism of systemic risk because they
borrow from and trade with regulated
financial institutions, such as prime bro-
kers and investment banks.Mexican peso crisis in 1994, and the Asian currency crisis in 1997. Generally speak-
ing, Eichengreen et al. (1998) viewed hedge funds as too small to exert significant
impact on financial markets. Fung and Hsieh (2000a) provided some quantitative
support using hedge fund returns, including high-frequency weekly and daily data
collected from public sources.
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The view that hedge funds are too small to exert significant market impact was
challenged by the near bankruptcy of LTCM in 1998. The recent growth of the hedge
fund industry has also brought this issue back into the foreground for regulators. In
this section, we put forward the idea that the risk hedge funds pose to market integrity
has shifted from the likes of mega currency speculators or a highly leveraged power-
house like LTCM to that of a convergence of leveraged opinions among funds that
individually may easily operate unnoticed. The avoidance of this phenomenon may
well require the action of better-informed portfolio investors—through greater trans-
parency on the part of hedge fund managers and better access to risk management
tools—as well as more discriminating leverage providers to hedge funds, the finan-
cial intermediaries.
To this end, there are promising signs in the evolution path the hedge fund indus-
try has taken. Transparency is improving, but more needs to be done. Risk manage-
ment tools for hedge fund portfolios are becoming commonplace. Perhaps more
research and standardization in this area would help avoid a proliferation of risk man-
agement models that are as bewildering to consumers as opaque hedge funds. Capital
requirements for certain financial institutions—banks and insurance companies—
investing in hedge funds are directing them toward demanding more transparency
and risk management. Compliance requirements from regulators such as the Financial
Stability Authority (FSA) in London together with the institutionalization process of
hedge funds have greatly improved the operational integrity of hedge fund firms.
These are all helpful and healthy developments in the hedge fund market and certainly
look like a much more promising path than imposing direct, specific regulations on
hedge funds themselves.
Just as important has been the development in the supply side of hedge fund
products. Consistent with our simple model of the hedge fund business, the emer-
gence of multistrategy hedge fund firms as a solution to the life cycles of hedge fund
strategies and the demand for institutional quality products have had a positive influ-
ence on the hedge fund industry. Hedge fund firms are becoming better organized,
better diversified, and more averse to erratic performance that could damage their
enterprise value. Perhaps we are witnessing the maturity of a hedge fund industry
that blends the best of the regulatory environment with rational economic behavior
on the part of investors, financial intermediaries, and hedge fund managers.
Alternative Alpha, Synthetic Hedge Funds, and the Price for Talent
In this section, we turn to the companion question of hedge fund systematic risk
(beta) frequently asked by investors: Do hedge funds achieve excess returns beyond
exposure to systematic risk factors?
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15. The Brady Commission is properly known as the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms
(1988).
16. More recently, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) investigated the role of hedge funds in the tech-
nology bubble of 1999–2000. They found little evidence that hedge funds were short tech stocks.
Instead, they found evidence consistent with the view that hedge funds rode the bubble on the
way up and then exited relatively quickly in early 2000.
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The search for alpha—have all the low-hanging fruits been picked? In our
opinion, the cleanest way to assess hedge fund alpha is through the returns of FoFs.
Data on FoFs have fewer biases than data on individual hedge funds, as pointed out
in Fung and Hsieh (2000b), and they reflect the actual investment experience in
hedge funds, netting out the cost of due diligence, portfolio construction, etc.
Fung et al. (2006) estimated the alpha of FoFs from the merged TASS, HFR, and
CISDM databases, using the seven risk factors from Fung and Hsieh (2004b). While
the average FoF does not deliver statistically significant alpha, about 22 percent have
positive alpha (significant at the 95 percent level). These “have-alpha” FoFs have a
higher probability of remaining “have-alpha” FoFs than the remaining “beta-only”
FoFs. They tend to have a steady inflow of capital, which does not exhibit return-
chasing behavior. In contrast, the “beta-only” FoFs experience both inflows and out-
flows that have return-chasing behavior.
Additionally, Fung et al. (2006) found that alpha in both have-alpha and have-
beta FoFs has declined in the recent period (April 2000 to December 2004) relative
to earlier periods. This decline coincides with the large inflow of money into the
hedge fund industry and is consistent with the prediction of Berk and Green (2004)
that fund flows will drive down the net-of-fee excess returns to zero so that there
should be no excess return to investors in equilibrium.
Can cheap hedge funds be created? If portfolios of hedge funds that are lim-
ited to ready-packaged hedge fund products are suffering from dwindling alphas, the
natural question that arises is, Can synthetic hedge funds be created at a lower cost
to investors?
There is a growing literature on replicating hedge fund returns using statistical
techniques. Here we provide a brief review of this approach. Generally, there are two
main issues to be resolved. It is natural to expect hedge fund managers to have
dynamic exposures to factor bets (beta bets). This conclusion naturally flows from
our simple hedge fund business model. Viewed as a business, the incentive is for the
hedge fund manager to maximize his or her enterprise value. To that end, the ten-
dency is to diversify the income stream to the hedge fund management company.
This diversification process, we believe, has been the primary motive behind the
growth of multistrategy hedge funds (from 0.5 percent to 12–14 percent of total
capacity). As different strategies are introduced into the portfolio mix, different risk
factors will emerge and evolve over time. Statistical techniques without explicit
recognition of the changing risk factors are unlikely to be able to explain where the
next risk is coming from.
Replicating hedge fund alpha, on the other hand, takes us into the voluminous
literature on portable alphas. Fung and Hsieh (2004a) showed that there are
portable alphas in equity-related hedge fund strategies. However, we do not believe
that these alphas can be replicated by statistical means at a lower cost. After all, why
would anyone sell skill at below market-equilibrium price? Naturally, those who suc-
cessfully generate persistent hedge fund alphas will simply join the ranks of hedge
fund managers and price their services accordingly. So long as alpha remains a
scarce commodity, new discoveries of alternative alpha sources are unlikely to
depress the market price for alpha.
Issues on compensating talent. Hedge fund returns are a mixture of alpha and
beta components with differing production costs and capacity constraints. This con-
sideration leads us directly back to various incentive fee issues in the hedge fund
business model. Such a discussion necessarily involves the governance structure to
align managers’ incentives with those of investors. The paper by Lehmann (2006) at
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA this conference deals with these issues in greater detail. Here are some immediate
issues that flow directly from our discussions.
Presumably investors are more willing to pay fees for hard-to-replicate alphas
(and, to a lesser extent, hard-to-replicate factor bets or alternative beta factors) than
returns from more easily replicable conventional beta-like exposures. To date, very
few hedge fund contracts explicitly recog-
nize these problems. For instance, rarely
does one come across risk-adjusted bench-
marks being used as part of the incentive
fee hurdle. For now, there are no univer-
sally accepted investable performance
benchmarks for different hedge fund
strategies. The performance history of investable hedge fund indexes has thus far
raised more questions than answers to the whole question of benchmarking hedge
fund performance.
There is a companion problem to the benchmarking issue in designing incentive fee
contracts. Often, and in recognition of the deficiencies of the existing incentive fee con-
tract, some investors have demanded co-investing—that is, that hedge fund managers
should invest a substantial amount of their personal wealth alongside the investors of
the funds they manage. This practice reduces the incentive for the manager to maxi-
mize the call option features embedded in the incentive contract by taking unjustifiable
risks; for a detailed discussion of these issues, see Goetzmann, Ingersol, and Ross
(2003). On the one hand, this co-investing may improve the alignment of interests on
the downside but can also lead to overconservatism by the manager on the upside, as
shown in Carpenter (2000). This outcome is often the case because most hedge fund
investors are far more diversified than the hedge fund manager. Of course, the exis-
tence of incentive fees mitigates part of this problem. However, precisely how these
two features of the hedge fund compensation model should be combined must ulti-
mately depend on the inherent risk of the strategies used by the fund manager.
Expressed differently, once again the solution to this problem needs the proper identi-
fication of the risk factors underlying different hedge fund strategies.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has provided an overview of the growth of the hedge fund industry over the
last decade as it evolved into adolescence. Academic research has played a contribu-
tory role in publicizing some of the key features of this opaque industry. However,
research has a way of uncovering more questions than answers. This is clearly the case
with a dynamic, multifaceted industry like hedge funds. By putting forward a simple
model of the hedge fund business, we have pulled together some of the important
issues involving investors in hedge fund products, financial intermediaries, and regula-
tors into a single framework. This framework reveals a fundamental question common
to a number of important concerns regarding the future of the hedge fund industry—
namely, the identification of systemic risk factors inherent in hedge fund strategies.
We believe that this identification is the key input to important questions such as
optimal contract design between buyers and sellers of hedge fund products. These
questions in turn have important implications for risk monitoring of hedge funds by
financial intermediaries as well as regulators.
In addition, understanding these risk factors helps to clarify seemingly complex
and chaotic changes in the hedge fund industry. For example, during the early 1990s,
the hedge fund industry was dominated by macro hedge funds. Today, database
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vendors report a myriad of hedge fund strategies that have no uniform definition. In
reality, our simple hedge fund business model implies that hedge fund managers will
diversify in order to maximize the enterprise value of their firm. This implication is
consistent with the growing trend of multistrategy hedge funds. There are clear sim-
ilarities between the way in which macro funds choose factor bets and the tactical
strategy allocation process of multistrategy
hedge funds. Interestingly, both exhibit
significant factor correlation to our risk
factor model. We would argue that, from
this perspective, the evolution of hedge
fund strategies has been much more linear
than it may appear at first glance. Apparent
style changes over the last decade are
consistent with hedge fund managers’ maximizing their enterprise value by diversi-
fying the impact of differing life cycles of hedge fund strategies.
The past few years have witnessed acquisition of hedge fund firms by regulated
financial institutions. This trend, coupled with our model of the hedge fund business,
implies that the price discovery process of a hedge fund firm is emerging. From what
we have seen thus far, pricing favors those with a steady, diversified stream of fee
income. This development in turn should reduce the risk of excessive risk taking by
individual hedge fund managers.
However, diversifying behavior by individual hedge funds does not preclude the
risk of leveraged opinions converging onto the same set of bets. Consequently, risk
monitoring of the hedge fund industry should reorient its focus away from megafirms
to the convergence of factor bets. For example, many different strategies may indi-
vidually appeal to valid reasons to take on credit risk, but, taken together, they may
put the industry as a whole at a dangerous level of concentration on a single risk
factor. The management of convergence risk begins with the identification of risk fac-
tors common to different hedge fund strategies.
Recognizing potential risk concentration does not in itself remedy the situation.
More than likely the prevention of convergence risk involves action by hedge fund
investors, financial intermediaries, regulators, and the hedge fund managers them-
selves. To this end, better transparency will help investors reshape their portfolios
away from excessive exposure to factor bets. Compensation contracts that help iden-
tify “me too” types of hedge funds will precipitate withdrawal of capital, thereby
reducing the risk of herding. Fee structures that reward managers on a risk-adjusted
basis will help steer hedge funds away from unwarranted factor bets that could dam-
age their firms’ enterprise value. Identifying risk factors inherent in hedge fund
strategies is a good beginning, but guidance from regulators toward better disclosure
and transparency from hedge fund managers is needed to align everyone’s interest.
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